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Health and guardianship law 
Editor: Dr Malcolm Smith 
CHILDREN, CONSENT AND THE REFUSAL OF BLOOD: A RECENT 
QUEENSLAND CASE 
BY MALCOLM SMITH 
In the recent decision of The Hospital v T [2015] QSC 185, the Supreme Court of 
Queensland dealt with an application relating to the medical treatment of a seven and a half 
year old child with serious liver disease. Evidence was presented to the court outlining the 
fact that the child, referred to as “J”, would soon require a liver transplant. The medical 
evidence also indicated that a blood transfusion is required in approximately 95% of 
transplantation procedures, therefore meaning that J was likely to require a blood 
transfusion in the circumstances.
1
 Although the child’s parents were willing to provide 
consent to the transplantation of a liver should one become available, they were not willing 
to provide consent to authorise a blood transfusion due to their religious beliefs as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses. The case therefore centred on the issue of whether a transfusion 
could be authorised should it become necessary.  
Parental decision-making and the refusal of treatment 
By virtue of s 61C of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), each parent of a child is vested with 
parental responsibility, encompassing “all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority 
which, by law, parents have in relation to children”.
2
 It is therefore accepted that parents 
have the authority to consent to medical treatment on behalf of their children, which logically 
therefore also means that parents have the right to refuse to consent to medical treatment in 
certain circumstances. However, a parent’s authority to consent (or refuse to consent) is not 
unfettered; parental decision-making in relation to children is limited to the extent that the 
decision accords with the child’s best interests.
3
 The notion of best interests is a vague term 
that is not well defined in law. There have been cases in Australia where treatment has been 
ordered contrary to the parents’ refusal, based on the view that the refusal of treatment did 
not accord with the child’s best interests.
4
 Nevertheless, Queensland legislation permits the 
administration of blood products in the absence of parental consent (and without court 
authorisation), where the provision of blood is necessary to save the life of a child. Thus, s 
20 of the Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) states:  
 (1) Where a blood transfusion is administered by a medical practitioner to a child, the medical 
practitioner or any person acting in aid of the medical practitioner and under the medical 
practitioner's supervision in administering such transfusion, shall not incur any criminal liability by 
reason only that the consent of a parent of the child or a person having authority to consent to the 
administration of the transfusion was refused or not obtained if– 
(a) in the opinion of the medical practitioner a blood transfusion was necessary to preserve 
the life of the child; and 
(b) either– 
(i) upon and after in person examining the child, a second medical practitioner 
concurred in such opinion before the administration of the blood transfusion; or 
(ii) the medical superintendent of a base hospital, being satisfied that a second 
medical practitioner is not available to examine the child and that a blood transfusion 
was necessary to preserve the life of the child, consented to the transfusion before it 
was administered (which consent may be obtained and given by any means of 
communication whatever). 
(2) Where a blood transfusion is administered to a child in accordance with this section, the 
transfusion shall, for all purposes, be deemed to have been administered with the consent of a 
parent of the child or a person having authority to consent to the administration. 
 
 In the circumstances of the case, the need to provide blood had not yet arisen; the 
formal consent process for the procedure had not been initiated and thus, the legislation was 
not directly relevant. However, as summarised by Douglas J, the concern for the applicant 
was that, “if it does come to the time when a transplant is needed … it would be a very 
                                                          
1 The Hospital v T [2015] QSC 185 at [13]. 
2 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 61B. 
3 Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218. 
4 See Re Heather [2010] NSWSC 1560. 
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difficult situation if [the] issue of consent to a blood transfusion was left undecided”.
 5
 It was 
also noted that as a liver transplant is a complicated procedure, the transplantation team 
would have greater confidence in their actions knowing that an explicit consent for the 
transfusion of blood was given. On this basis, a determination was made in relation to the 
lawfulness of the proposed blood transfusion, should the need to provide blood products 
arise. In this regard, the court considered a number of factors when making the decision. 
Reasons underpinning the decision 
The guiding factor in the court’s determination was based on the child’s best interests. Thus, 
it was stated that “the welfare of the child is the Court’s first and paramount consideration 
and the Court must make its own independent judgment on any question which involves the 
interests of the child”.
6
 The child’s parents had argued that there was some discussion on 
the internet to suggest that red blood cells are harmful in some clinical situations, but this 
was rejected by the court; Douglas J noted that the medical evidence presented before him 
was unanimous in the view that the transfusion of blood in cases of this kind is of the highest 
importance in terms of preserving life.
7
 Additionally, citing the decision of the New South 
Wales Supreme Court in X v The Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network (2013) 85 NSWLR 
294, it was emphasised that the vulnerability of children requires that the sanctity of life is 
prioritised in cases where blood might be refused in life-threatening circumstances.
8
 
Fundamentally, in this case it was held that the sanctity of the child’s life was of greater 
significance than the sincerely held religious beliefs of the child’s parents. For these 
reasons, Douglas J made an order permitting the health care team to provide blood products 
in the event that a blood transfusion should be needed as part of the liver transplantation 
procedure. 
Comment 
The decision in this case is not surprising, given that in previous cases where the parens 
patriae jurisdiction has been invoked, the notion of the sanctity of life has been prioritised 
over religious beliefs underpinning parents’ refusal of blood products.
9
 However, the case 
provides an illuminating example of how the legality of a proposed blood transfusion can be 
the subject of an application to the Supreme Court, even in circumstances where it is likely 
that the transfusion would be legally permitted under legislation, should it be necessary to 
save a child’s life. Thus, while the health care team required assurance about the legality of 
a possible blood transfusion which was ancillary to the success of the main medical 
procedure, the medical evidence emphasised the fact that a transfusion would be vital in 
preserving the life of the child. Consequently, this is likely to bring a transfusion within the 
scope of s 20 of the Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld).  
 Admittedly, one possible concern about the applicability of the Queensland legislative 
provision in these circumstances is that the provision explicitly states that no criminal liability 
shall be incurred for providing blood in the circumstances stipulated within the legislation. 
However, it is also stated in s 20(2) that where a blood transfusion is administered in 
accordance with the provision, it shall, “for all purposes, be deemed to have been 
administered with the consent of a parent of the child or a person having authority to 
consent to the administration” (emphasis added). On this basis, it could be argued that the 
use of the words “for all purposes”’ implies that the absence of such consent would not 
prove problematic from a legal perspective, as long as the legislative requirements of s 20 
are met. 
 One interesting point to note from the judgment is that the court placed particular 
emphasis on the medical evidence. Thus, the assessment of best interests focused 
predominantly on medical interests in terms of preserving the life of a child. This is 
understandable, given the potential consequences in such circumstances, but it is also 
important to note that jurisprudence on the topic of decision-making for, and on behalf of, 
incompetent persons, has moved towards a wider notion of “best interests” encompassing 
social and welfare interests, as well as medical interests.
10
 Furthermore, although the law 
seems sufficiently clear in terms of providing blood products to children in life-threatening 
circumstances, it is obvious that a statutory provision such as that provided for in s 20 of the 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld), is of less practical assistance in cases where 
                                                          
5 The Hospital v T [2015] QSC 185 at [19]. 
6 The Hospital v T [2015] QSC 185 at [21], citing Children, Youth and Women’s Health Services Inc v YJL (2010) 107 SASR 
343. 
7 The Hospital v T [2015] QSC 185 at [22]. 
8 The Hospital v T [2015] QSC 185 at [24] 
9 See X v The Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network (2013) 85 NSWLR 294. 
10 See Willmott L, White B, and Smith MK, “Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment in a Patient’s 
Best Interests: Australian Judicial Deliberations” (2014) 21(4) Journal of Law and Medicine 920 at 920-941. 
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the conversation around the administration of blood products arises in non-urgent 
circumstances. In such cases, health care teams are navigating a process of consent; a 
process that requires exploration of possible outcomes and consequences, including the 
need to discuss what should happen if blood were required to save a patient’s life. Although 
s 20 potentially provides a basis to lawfully administer blood to children in the face of refusal, 
in cases such as this it effectively silences the views, values and beliefs of the parents, 
which might be expressed during the consent process. It is therefore understandable why 
the health care team in this case sought the sanction of the court. Nevertheless, moving 
forward, it is also clear that in the future, should a similar case arise, reliance on s 20 of the 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) will provide a justificatory basis for the 
provision of blood products as long as the requirements of the legislation are complied with.  
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